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Abstract
Kolstad￿ s (1994) model of intertemporal, competitive supply
to a linear market from two distinct exhaustible resource deposits
admits two di⁄erent interior solutions ￿one with the low cost
deposit "earning" the higher resource rent and the other with the
low cost deposit "earning" the lower resource rent. This latter
outcome turns on the initial size of the low cost deposit being
signi￿cantly larger than the high cost deposit. We infer then
that size can trump quality in the determination of the resource
rent for a deposit, when geography is explicit.
￿ key words: exhaustible resource extraction, deposit quality,
linear market
￿ highlights: lower cost deposits earning less rent>, resource
extraction in a linear market>,evolution of market sizes>.
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1 Introduction
Kolstad￿ s (1994) model of intertemporal, competitive supply to a linear
market from two distinct exhaustible resource deposits admits two dif-
ferent interior solutions ￿one with the low cost deposit "earning" the
higher resource rent and the other with the low cost deposit "earning"
the lower resource rent. This latter outcome turns on the initial size of
the low cost deposit being larger than the high cost deposit. We infer
￿Gerard Gaudet provided comments to an earlier draft which put this research
back on track. We are much indebted to him.
1then that deposit size can trump in situ quality in the determination
of the resource rent for a deposit. Such valuation scenarios have not
appeared in aspatial Hotelling (1931) models with deposits of distinct
qualities (eg. Her￿ndahl (1967)).1 Our result does not turn on the rela-
tive accessibility of di⁄erent deposit to markets. Accessibility would be
a third factor, in addition to quality and deposit size, in the determi-
nation of resource rent and we have nothing to say about accessibility
per se below. We proceed below to spell out the details of Kolstad￿ s
model and to work through in detail four complete numerical examples,
the ￿rst a numerical rendering of the case Kolstad chose to analyze in
his article (our Case A: the small, low-cost deposit is extracted from
along with the larger high-cost deposit and the small, low-cost deposit
is exhausted in a Phase I). Our other three cases are distinctly di⁄er-
ent versions of Kolstad￿ s model. We distinguish then below among the
Kolstad model, Kolstad￿ s solution, our Case C solution, with the low
cost deposit "earning" the lower resource rent, our Case B, with the low
cost deposit "earning" the higher resource rent and our Case D, with a
high-cost deposit of relatively small size.
A principal merit of Kolstad￿ s spatial framework is that it allows for
solutions with deposits of distinctly di⁄erent qualities in situ supply-
ing to a market at the same time. Morris Adelman among others has
contended that Hotelling extraction theory was pretty well useless for ex-
plaining real-world oil extraction scenarios because such theory could not
account for real-world supply ￿ ows emanating simultaneously from de-
posits of obviously distinct qualities (Adelman and Watkins (1992) and
Cairns and Davis (2001)). The introduction of geography to Hotelling￿ s
framework,2 along the lines of Kolstad (1994), turns out to be a sim-
1Nordhaus (1973) worked with a complicated Her￿ndahl model with deposits and
demanders at di⁄erent points on the surface of the earth. Buried in Nordhaus￿ s
empirical work should be a realization of the valuation phenomenon we are focusing
on here.
2Gaudet, Moreaux, and Salant (2001) deal with exhaustible resource extraction
2ple way to extend Hotelling extraction theory to a theory that deals
satisfactorily with the Adelman problem. In addition, the introduction
of explicit space allows one to move beyond the standard result that
lowest-cost deposits "earn" highest resource rents.
The model has propective buyers of a unit of say oil located in uni-
form density on a linear market. Stocks are located at each end of
the ￿nite line, the right-hand one generally with lower, unchanging unit
extraction cost. At each instant, resource rent at each supply point is ris-
ing at the rate of interest (Hotelling￿ s zero pro￿t intertemporal arbitrage
condition). In Phase I, the market is split between competitive suppliers
(think of each unit of stock owned by a distinct price-taking ￿rm) by a
delivered price, the same for each "supplier" (Cases B, C and D). This
delivered price rises smoothly as time passes to an exogenously-set choke
price, p. At this date, Phase II opens with each "supplier" supplying to
an own-market with an "edge" delivered-price at the choke price. A hole
has opened in the "center" of the market and this hole grows steadily
as time passes, with rents continuing to rise at the rate of interest. Re-
source rent at Right (R) rises to p￿cR at the instant of exhaustion and
Left￿ s rises to p ￿ cL at its instant of exhaustion, for ci unit extraction
cost for "supplier" i: For Case B (Right with unit costs distinctly lower
and a stock size somewhat larger) we observe R with higher resource
rent and an ever-contracting spatial market. For Case C (R and L with
similar unit costs of extraction (R￿ s lower) and R￿ s stock size signi￿-
cantly larger than L￿ s), we observe that R￿ s resource rent is lower and
her market-size is steadily expanding in Phase I. Market sizes for each
"supplier" always contract in Phase II as time passes. Resource rent at
each site rises smoothly at the rate of interest for both "suppliers" over
both phases. There is no jump in rent or price at the date of the change
in phases.
in a two dimensional space.
32 The Analysis
Our setting is supposed to be competitive and thus one should consider
each unit of resource owned and supplied by a price-taking ￿rm. We
have used the word "supplier" above in the sense that supply is ￿ owing
out of a particular deposit but one should keep in mind that our setting
is supposed to be truly competitive, with quantity supplied at a moment
of time being "organized" by many small, price-taking ￿rms.
Our linear market is of length G: Demanders are located on the line
in uniform density. Each buyer buys one unit per unit time at the
delivered price as long as this price is less than or equal to the cut-o⁄
or choke price, p: We normalize so that distance is the same as quantity
supplied.3 Hence if QL(t) is being supplied at an instant, the size of
L￿ s (left￿ s) linear market is QL(t) in units of distance. At each end, we
have the left supplier indicated by L and right supplier indicated by
R: Demanders buy a unit at delivered price, pi
m + ￿ui when located at
distance ui from supplier i: i = L;R: pi
m is the mill price or price at the
site of extraction. ￿ is transportation cost per unit per unit distance. ci
is the unit extraction cost for supplier i: When extraction costs di⁄er,
we deal consistently with cR < cL: That is, R has the high quality stock
in situ.
Benchmark results.
CHANGE IN STOCK SIZE:
Consider the symmetric case (cR = cL and stock sizes (SL
0 and sR
0 )
equal and selected so that each market size is initially at G=2). We have















m(0) mill prices at L and R respectively. The split-price
3If u(t) is distance from the left supplier to its right hand market edge, then left￿ s
current demand is ￿u(t) for ￿ uniform density of demanders on the line. We set ￿ = 1
making current quantity demanded for the left supplier, QL(t) equal to ￿u(t):
4is that which is dividing the whole market between the two suppliers at
an instant. Beyond time zero, the resource rent at each site, pL
m(t) ￿ cL
and pR
m(t) ￿ cR respectively, is rising at rate r and a hole is opening up
in the center of the market as each supplier￿ s market shrinks gradually,
reaching zero at the instant rents reach p ￿ cL and p ￿ cR for L and R
respectively. r is the market rate of interest and becomes the e⁄ective
discount rate in our analysis.
We now add a small amount to R￿ s initial stock and re-solve our
supply problem. The new initial split-price will be below p and to the
left of its counterpart above. R￿ s initial rent will now be less than L￿ s
initial rent. The more abundant stock for R implies a lower value per
unit. The new supply scenario will have two phases. Over each phase
each supplier￿ s rent will be rising at rate r and there will be no jumps.
Over Phase I, the market will be fully supplied by the two "outputs"
from the two suppliers and split-price will rise to p at time T. See Figure
1.
5L￿ s market size will be contracting over Phase I.4 Phase II opens with
a small hole opening in the "center" of the market and over Phase II
each supplier￿ s market size shrinks, reaching zero at the instant rents
reach p ￿ cL and p ￿ cR for L and R respectively. Each initial stock is
exhausted at the instant that respective rents reach p ￿ cL and p ￿ cR:
The duration of Phase II will in general di⁄er for the two suppliers. At
time zero, R￿ s mill price will be lower and it will have the larger of the
two market shares. As time passes its market share will be rising.
When one thinks about actually solving such a problem, one should
work backwards in time from each supplier￿ s end point. The determina-
tion of the split point in the market for the beginning of Phase II will
be endogenous.
CHANGES IN EXTRACTION COSTS:
Our reference case is the symmetric one set out above. Now we
consider cR declining from its value when cR = cL: The new initial split-
price will be below p and to the left of its counterpart above. R￿ s initial
rent will now be larger than L￿ s initial rent. The higher quality for R￿ s
stock implies a higher value per unit. The new supply scenario will have
two phases. Over each phase each supplier￿ s rent will be rising at rate
r and there will be no jumps. Over Phase I, the market will be fully
supplied by the two "outputs" from the two suppliers and split-price will
rise to p at time T. L￿ s market size will be expanding, in this case, over
Phase I. Phase II opens with a small hole opening in the "center" of the
market and over Phase II each supplier￿ s market size shrinks, reaching
zero at the instant rents reach p￿cL and p￿cR for L and R respectively.
Each initial stock is exhausted at the instant that respective rents reach
p￿cL and p￿cR: The duration of Phase II will in general di⁄er for the
two suppliers.
These are two basic comparative statics exercises that can guide our
4This follows from the fact that R￿ s initial rent has become smaller than L￿ s and
each rent must rise at rate r over Phase I.
6intuition for our following four cases.
3 Case A (Kolstad): Small High-quality Initial Stock
In Phase I, of length T; the full market is being supplied by both suppliers







m(t) + ￿[G ￿ Q
L(t)]:
At each date mill price pi
m = ci+￿
i(t) for ￿
i(t) the current resource rent
at the site of deposit i. Phase I ends with QR(T) = SR(T) = 0 and
QL(T) = G: There will be a delivered price at date T with p(T) =
cL + ￿
L(T) + ￿G at the market edge at G.
Consider an example.
We assume cR = 1:0; cL = 2:9; r = 0:1; ￿ = 0:1 and G = 40: We
proceed to ￿x L￿ s stock size which she puts on the market in Phase I
at 110 units and to solve for R￿ s initial stock, SR
0 which solves Phase I
correctly (L￿ s initial market size grows over the interval to G).

























Recall that the value of QL
T is set at G. Hence we can solve for T in
SL
0 = 110 =
R T
0 QL(t)dt: We integrate
R T





cR + ￿G ￿ cL
2￿
￿
T ￿ (1 ￿ e
￿rT)
￿






0 = 110;we obtain T = 3:06323: Since TG = SL
0 + SR
0 and have
solved for T; we have a value for R￿ s total sales over Phase I, namely
7SR
0 = 12:5292. Hence we have obtained SR
0 as a function of SL
0 : We
obtain QL(0) = 32:2164; and with QL













The relatively large initial rent for R implies, given each rent rising at
rate r; that R￿ s market will be shrinking as time passes. Given the values
for initial rents, we have the prices, pR(0) = 9:0976 and pL(0) = 6:6544:
Beyond T; marking the end of Phase I, is Phase II with L supplying alone
in the market, an amount QL(t) = G at each instant until delivered price
reaches p: Phase II ends with L￿ s delivered price reaching p: Her rent is
rising smoothly over Phase II at rate r: In Phase III, L￿ s rent continues
to rise at rate r and her market size is shrinking smoothly, with delivered
price at her market edge being p at each instant. Phase III ends with
QL(t) and SL(t) each reaching zero.5
We solved our example by ￿xing L￿ s amount of stock to be put on the
market in Phase I at 110 units. A more satisfactory approach and more
di¢ cult to execute would have R and L￿ s total stocks set initially and the
supply paths worked out backwards from the ￿nal date of L￿ s supply.
In this case, L￿ s amount of stock to be put on the market in Phase
I would be endogenous. Such a somewhat more satisfactory solution
would be qualitatively unchanged from ours above. Clearly our approach
to solving has the merit of relative simplicity. We employ a variant of
this approach in our analyses below.
Our example above is the same, in a qualitative sense, as the one
reported by Kolstad (1994). It can be characterized as having the low-
5If L were alone in the market (R with initial stock of zero units) and we worked
back from the end over two phases, we would run into the cookie-cutter problem:
L￿ s stock would not ￿t precisely in the time slots and its QL(0) would not equal
G in general. However, once we have R with some stock, we can, with reasonable
parameters, eliminate the cookie-cutter problem.
8cost supplier "move ￿rst" (here in fact simultaneous with the high-cost
producer) and exhaust her relatively small stock (low-cost) in a Phase
I. Each supplier￿ s rent in situ is rising at rate r in Phase I and the
phase ends with the low-cost supplier exhausting her initial stock just
as the high-cost supplier is about to supply to all demanders in the
linear market. Kolstad did not inquire about cases with each supplier
with an initial stock of a similar size or about cases with the low-cost
supplier having a much larger initial stock. These variants are not trivial
extensions of our "base case" above. We turn to these novel variants.
4 Case B: Similar stock sizes, Distinctly di⁄erent
qualities
In Phase I, of length T; the full market is being supplied by both suppliers







m(t) + ￿[G ￿ Q
L(t)]:
At each date mill price pi
m = ci + ￿
i(t) for ￿
i(t) the current resource
rent at the site of deposit i. Phase I ends with pS(T) = p: Hence over
the interval 0 to T; the delivered split-price rises for each supplier to its
terminal value, p: The split in the market is de￿ned by quantity QL(t);
current supply of L. The other portion of the market is then G ￿ QL(t)
and is current output from R. At the end of this initial phase, we observe
L supplying QL
T and R supplying G￿QL
T: Over this ￿rst Phase we indicate
SL
0 and SR
0 as total supply put on the market from L and R respectively.
Total initial stocks are then KL and KR:
In Phase II, there are positive amounts of each stock remaining,
namely e SL = KL￿ SL
0 and e SR = KR ￿ SR
0 : Beyond T; a hole opens
smoothly in the "center" of the market (QL(t) declines from QL
T and
QR(t) declines from G￿QL
T ) as each supplier has her market size shrink
smoothly with delivered price at the spatial margin for each market re-
9maining at p: Rent at the supply point continues to rise at the rate of
interest for each supplier. e SL and e SR each are exhausted at the moment
that rent for L reaches p￿cL and rent for R reaches p￿cR; respectively.
The durations of exhaustion for e SL and e SR will be di⁄erent in general.
Hence it is correct to say that each supplier has a Phase II of di⁄erent
length.
An easy way to ￿ll in details of our equilibrium is to ￿rst treat e SL as
exogenous with SL
0 = KL ￿ e SL and e SR and SR
0 as endogenous. In this
approach one has e SR and SR
0 functions of e SL: (Later one obtains the
complete solution by relaxing the assumption of e SL as exogenous. One
then has each of e SR, SR
0 and SL
0 as endogenous, with e SR+ SR
0 = KR
and e SL + SL
0 = KL :)
Detailed analysis: We start in Phase II with e SL exogenous. We are
















0 QL(t)dt = e SL; we can solve for
the value of e T L and the value of QL(t) at the beginning of Phase II.
Upon integrating
R e TL















We proceed with a numerical example. Let G = 40; ￿ = 0:1; cR = 1;






6Observe that cR + ￿G = 5 and this exceeds cL = 2:9: This is a condition which
Kolstad imposes in order that the right-hand supplier not under-cut the left-hand
supplier in terms of costs. More on this below.
10This latter quantity we write as QL
T for T the length of Phase I. Our
solved QL
T is about half the whole market. QL
T is de￿ning the market
split point at the end of Phase I.
With regard to R, we have her rent at the end of Phase I as
￿




This rent must equal the discounted rent at the end of Phase II, namely
[p ￿ cR]e￿r e TR for e T R the length of Phase II for R. Given QL
T; we solve



























e SR is the sum of sales for R in Phase II. This is a value for e SR as a
function of e SL; this latter exogenous for the moment.7
We turn to Phase I.
Over Phase I, the sum of sales from the two suppliers ￿lls the market
of length G at each instant. In Phase I, the markets are separated at







m(t) + ￿[G ￿ Q
L(t)]:
At each date mill price pi
m = ci+￿
i(t) for ￿
i(t) the current resource rent.
This rent is assumed to be rising at the rate of interest, r: We have then













7 e TR = 2:08128 can be read as Phase II involving about 2 time periods, in discrete
time, for R. R￿ s supply in its second-to-last period is then about 40-19:33133 ￿ = 20:7;
leaving about 1.6 units to put on the market in its ￿nal period.












Recall that the value of QL
T has been solved for in Phase II, above.
Hence we can solve for T in SL
0 = KL ￿ e SL =
R T
0 QL(t)dt: We integrate
R T





cR + ￿G ￿ cL
2￿
￿
T ￿ (1 ￿ e
￿rT)
￿






0 = 7;we obtain T = 0:36511: Since TG = SL
0 + SR
0 and have
solved for T; we have a value for R￿ s total sales over Phase I, namely
SR
0 = 7:6046. Hence we have obtained SR
0 as a function of e SL: Note then
that KL = 24 + 7 and KR = 22:2542 + 7:6046: Hence total stocks put
on the market di⁄er by only about one unit for the two suppliers or the
size of each deposit is about the same at time zero.













and the initial quantity extracted by L is 19.0147 and by R is (40-
19.0147).8
Note that the point of market split in Phase I is moving TO THE
RIGHT, from 19.0147 initially to 19:33133 at date T. This type of
motion is a direct consequence of ￿
R(0) > ￿
L(0) and subsequent rents
moving up at r%: (A simple sketch establishes this.)
There are no loose ends to our analysis above. However, matters
were much simpli￿ed by our taking e SL and SL
0 as exogenous and SR
0 and
e SR as endogenous. Conceptually, it is easy to now dispense with this
8We have veri￿ed that when these initial rents rise at r% over the combined time
intervals for the two phases, we get the correct terminal rents.
12crutch. Suppose now that we have e SL and SL
0 only to be positive and
sum to 31, and SR
0 + e SR equal to say 31; with each positive: 31 is close
to the sum of SR
0 and e SR that we observed above (22:2542 + 7:6046).
Hence one can envisage a brute for search over values of e SL near 24 (with
SL
0 + e SL = 31) that in fact brings the sum of SR
0 and e SR; endogenous
still, to the exogenously set value of 31. We would then have a solution
devoid of the "pre-cooking" of the values of e SL and SL
0 .9
5 Case C: Similar Stock Qualities and Sizes
It turns out to be straightforward to change our parameters to obtain an
"inverse" of the above case, one now with the low-cost supplier "pushing"
the point of market split to the left and "earning" a LOWER RENT
initially in situ. A parameter change that works is simply bringing the
two extraction costs close (cL = 2:9 and cR = 2:8 and following the same
solution steps as with Case B. This change leads to R putting a larger
amount on the market in Phase I).10
With cR equal now at 2.8 (up from 1.0), we can solve in this case for
e T Rin [p￿cR]e￿r e TR = [p￿￿[G￿QL
T]￿cR]; obtaining 2:5445: (Recall that
QL
T = 19:3313:) This leads to a new value for e SR; namely 27.41 (up from
the earlier value of 22:2542). The new value for T solves out as 0.36205.
R￿ s total supply in Phase I comes out as 7.482 (=SR
0 ). Hence KL is the
same at 40 units and KR is now 27.41+7.482￿ = 35; up from 30 for Case B.
9It appears that it would not be di¢ cult to specify parameters a priori that would
be incompatible with an interior solution of the type we have spelled out. This is
probably generic to equilibria with demand speci￿cations with choke prices.
10Recall that above at the beginning of Phase II, we had
￿
L(T) = [p ￿ ￿QL
T ￿ cL]
and ￿
R(T) = [p ￿ ￿[G ￿ QL
T] ￿ cR]:
Since each of these values gets discounted at the same rate and over the same interval
in order over Phase I, we see that ￿
L(T) > ￿




T = 19:33133 above, less than half of market size at 40. Hence inspection
of ￿
L(T) and ￿
R(T) above reveals that if cR were only a small amount less than cL;
we would have ￿
L(T) > ￿
R(T): This is our cue for re-solving.
13And our choice of cR gives us ￿
L(0) = 6:912; a value GREATER THAN
￿
R(0) = 6:8795: These values go along with L￿ s market CONTRACTING
over Phase I (from 19.3373 initially to 193313). We infer that we that a
relative abundance e⁄ect has yielded our reversal of results in this case
from results for Case B: here the similarity in extraction costs and larger
initial stock for R has yielded a lower resource rent for R￿ s deposit.11
Cases B and C illustrate the new economics in this contribution: in
a spatial framework, the high quality stock can be "earning" a lower
resource rent in situ because a relative stock size e⁄ect is trumping a
relative quality e⁄ect.
6 Case D: Small Initial High-cost Stock
The idea here is that the low-cost stock should be extracted from ￿rst,
a variant of the Her￿ndahl scenario. R should be the lone supplier
over a positive interval, with a market size G, and then the high-cost
stock should "enter". Then both exhaust in some kind of end scenario.
Central is the idea that each supplier￿ s rent should be rising over time
at the rate of interest, ideally free of jumps that might induce suppliers
to game possible jumps to the advantage of one or both. We consider
then a Phase I with R alone with supply G at each instant. A Phase II
opens with the high-cost supplier entering with an in￿nitesimal supply
while the low-cost supplier supplies the remaining part of the market.
Gradually over Phase II, the high-cost supplier￿ s market expands while
split-price rises to p: This ends Phase II. Over Phase III, each supplier￿ s
market contracts smoothly to zero and each exhausts when rent reaches
p ￿ cL for L and p ￿ cR for R. Note Phase III will in general be of a
di⁄erent duration for L and R. Our detailed solving turns up a variant
of this solution, only slightly di⁄erent.
11Clearly our initial rents for Case C di⁄er by a small amount and the shift in the
point of market split over Phase I is small. These crucial magnitudes become larger
as our exogenously set value for SL
0 is increased from its current value of 7 units.
14Solving this case follows the steps for Case B above exactly but now
with a relatively small stock size for L. We set cL = 4:9 and cR =
0:901:12 We work back in time. For Phase III, we set L￿ s terminal,
aggregate supply small, namely 16 units. We invoke rent shrinking at
r%: This leaves L with 14.0259 units of 40 (size of G) at the beginning
of Phase III. L￿ s time in Phase III is 2.20083 and R￿ s time is 2.6660.
R is putting 36.16034 units on the market in Phase III. Now for Phase
II. We work back with QL
T = 14:0259. Working back involves selecting
a trial value for L￿ s supply for Phase II and observing how close the
corresponding initial supply from R is to G. Repeated trials reveal that
this initial supply from R is asymtotically approaching G (=0.005) as
L￿ s corresponding supply is increased. For L￿ s supply at 190 units for
Phase II, R￿ s QR(t) is G￿0:005000: For this solution13 each initial rent
is in￿nitesimal with ￿
R(t) (=2.82￿10￿432)> ￿
L(t) (=1.89￿10￿432): R￿ s
supply over this interval is 398,138.0 units.
We arrived at this solution after (a) observing that we needed cL ￿
cR ￿ = ￿G and (b) re-solving for larger and larger values of L￿ s supply in
Phase II. Clearly this solution is the one we expect (or hope for) in a
qualitative sense but its asymptotic nature is surprising.
7 Concluding Remark
Kolstad worked with one solution to his model (our Case A above; small
high-quality initial stock) and left open how other solutions might work
or not work. We have investigated three other types of solution to his
model and have turned up three new results. First, other cases do indeed
have fairly regular solutions within his framework. Secondly, the "oppo-
site" to his case (small initial low-quality stock) has a well-behaved solu-
tion from an economics perspective but displays a somewhat ill-behaved
12These costs di⁄er by almost exactly ￿G: This turns out to matter.
13The value QL(t) = 0.0050 that is being reached depends on our choice of gap
size, [cR + ￿G] ￿ cL: This has magnitude 0.0010 in our example. The smaller we set
this gap, the smaller is the value of QL(t) being approached, backwards in time.
15solution from a numerical perspective (the solution is asymptotic). Third
and most important, we observed regular cases in which the high qual-
ity deposit ends up "earning" a lower resource rent. We inferred that
relative abundance was the force driving down resoure rent for this case
(our Case C).
We observe then that Hotelling extraction theory "goes through"
in a simple spatial setting (Kolstad￿ s model) but one new phenomenon
obtains, namely the possibility of a high quality deposit "earning" lower
resource rent.
16References
[1] Adelman, Morris A. and G.C. Watkins (1992) "Reserve asset val-
ues and the "hotelling valuation principle"", Working paper (Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy Policy Research)
; MIT-CEPR 92-004.
[2] Cairns, Robert D. and Graham A. Davis (2001) "Adelman￿ s Rule and
the Petroleum Firm," The Energy Journal, vol. 22 (3), pp. 31-54.
[3] Gaudet, Gerard, Michel Moreaux, and Stephen W. Salant (2001)
"Intertemporal Depletion of Resource Sites by Spatially Distributed
Users", American Economic Review, 91, 4, September, pp. 1149-
1159.
[4] Her￿ndahl, Orris C. (1967) ￿Depletion and Economic Theory￿in Ex-
tractive Resources and Taxation, ed. Mason Ga⁄ney, Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, pp. 63-90.
[5] Hotelling, Harold (1931) "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources",
Journal of Political Economy, 39, 2, April, pp. 137-175.
[6] Hotelling, Harold (1929) "Stability in Competition", Economic Jour-
nal, 39, pp. 41-57.
[7] Kolstad, Charles D. (1994) "Hotelling Rents in Hotelling Space:
Product Di⁄erentiation in Exhaustible Resource Markets", Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 26, pp. 163-180.
[8] Nordhaus, William (1973) "The Allocation of Energy Resources",
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 4, issue 3, pp. 529-576.
17